UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION

ROBERT BRAGGS,

Plaintiff,

Black, J.

VS.

Bowman, M.J.

BRUCE A. FAVRET, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Case No. 1:15-cv-505

Plaintiff, an inmate at FCI Elkton, in Lisbon, Ohio, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Bruce A. Favret and Roxann H. Dieffenbach, his former defense counsel. (*See* Doc. 1, p. 5). By separate Order, plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the Court for a *sua sponte* review of the complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. *See* Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

In enacting the original *in forma pauperis* statute, Congress recognized that a "litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits." *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an *in forma pauperis* complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. *Id.*; *see also* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or

law. *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 328-29; *see also Lawler v. Marshall*, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or "wholly incredible." *Denton*, 504 U.S. at 32; *Lawler*, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are "fantastic or delusional" in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. *Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 328).

Congress also has authorized the *sua sponte* dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). A complaint filed by a *pro se* plaintiff must be "liberally construed" and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); *see also Hill*, 630 F.3d at 470-71 ("dismissal standard articulated in *Iqbal* and *Twombly* governs dismissals for failure to state a claim" under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not "accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation." *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting *Papasan v. Allain*, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." *Id.* at 557. The complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." *Erickson*, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff, who is proceeding *pro se*, brings this § 1983 action against defendants Favret and Dieffenbach based on their alleged failure to investigate or correct his unlawfully imposed sentence. Plaintiff claims that he was sentenced to four hundred hours of community service as part of his December 18, 1989 sentence. He claims that his community service portion of his sentence was two hundred days beyond the statutory limitation, yet his attorneys—defendants Favret (trial) and Dieffenbach (appellate)—failed to correct the improper sentence. Based on the alleged denial of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, plaintiff seeks \$1,500,000 from each of the named defendants.

Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Section 1983 against defendants, his defense attorneys in his state criminal case. In order to maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must allege that the person engaging in the conduct complained of was acting under color of state law and that this conduct deprived plaintiff of some right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. *Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n*, 804 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing *Parratt v. Taylor*, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), *overruled*

in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). As lawyers representing a

client, defendants were not state actors within the meaning of § 1983. See Polk County v.

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (holding that public defender does not act under color of state law

for purposes of § 1983); McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (applying Polk

County to retained criminal lawyers). See also Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 289 (6th Cir.

1998). Therefore, plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief under section 1983 against

defendants and is subject to dismissal.

Accordingly, in sum, the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1) because plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted against any of the named defendants.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The plaintiff's complaint be **DISMISSED** with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).

2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an

appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith

and therefore deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

s/ Stephanie K. Bowman

Stephanie K. Bowman

United States Magistrate Judge

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NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to this Report & Recommendation ("R&R") within **FOURTEEN** (**14**) **DAYS** after being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent's objections within **FOURTEEN DAYS** after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. *See Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *United States v. Walters*, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).